The Vietcong

The Provisional Government of the Republic of South Vietnam soon learned how deadly firepower of the U.S was and decided to use the war of the flea with minor knocks very strongly. In theory this was a drive to crush the numerical superiority (ten to one, although that proportion was not always possible) and withdraw before the enemy’s reaction. Among the aid they got in neighboring countries, the U.S allowed a limited supply of explosive material for bombs and booby-traps.

The armament was a priority and other needs came secondary, almost the opposite to the enemy, where the logistical superiority of foreign troops carries no more than envy and hatred. A former member of the Vietcong recalled:

Our intelligence officials said that Americans had steaks, beer and ice cream bases, and that war only occupied part of his time. We had war on our shoulders everywhere we went, with or without weapons. Unlike them we had few medicines and no hospital when we hurt.

In addition, its adaptation to the terrain allowed them to live in hiding or working during the day and at night all kinds of attacks using the terrain and vegetation were adopted to harass the enemy. This night really belonged to them, because during those hours, it was they who dominated the field.

Contact and closeness with the local people allowed access to food and information. Before selecting a target, regimental commanders sent a scout to make contact with local people and prepare the entry, attack and retreat. If the three measures were considered possible the attack was carried out. These often consisted of human waves, but if he was careful in not wasting life and clearing the field of corpses, he was to be honored with a ceremony when the operation ended.

The chain of command of the Vietcong functioned as any army or even better. So much so that Americans were stunned by organizing attacks at the division level. A unit attacked a lower number and when requested reinforcements repelled the aggression, the forces sent were attacked by an even larger unit than the first. This was achieved by increasing impatience in aided supporters contributing to victory and the collapse of morality, this was one of the causes for the failed Operation Attleboro in 1966.

If the reinforcements were too big the Vietcong could always disappear into the jungle, except maybe one unit: the black pajamas. This unit comprised of more motivated men, wearing the traditional clothing of the peasants and carrying a submachine gun or a padlock and chain to tie to a tree in order to fight without retreat or surrender, to strike with force to enemies or allow the withdrawal of its companions.

The guerrillas were mostly communists who were not even men in their entirety. When a unit was short of troops they recruited women who fought with the same ferocity as their male counterparts. This ferocity, determination and disclaimers surprised the Americans, they often come to Southeast Asia for a replacement.